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Targeted Programs in an Economic Crisis:
Empirical Findings from the Experience of Indonesia
Lant Pritchett
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Sudarno Sumarto, Asep Suryahadi#
SMERU Research Institute
Abstract:  In response to the economic, natural, and political crisis that enveloped
Indonesia from August 1997 (beginning of depreciation) to May 1998 (Soeharto
resignation), the new government announced support for a set of “safety net” (JPS)
programs in the July 1998 budget.  These included: (a) targeted sales of subsidized
rice, (b) work creation programs, (c) scholarships to students and block grants to
schools, (d) targeted health care subsidies, (e) community block grants. Cross
sectional and panel data has been used to examine the targeting of these programs.
First, “static participation incidence” (the relationship between program participation
and household consumption expenditures) was substantially better than a uniform
transfer, but substantially worse than perfect targeting, and remarkably similar for all
of the JPS programs.  Second, unlike standard static incidence measures, what we
define as “dynamic participation incidence” — the relationship between changes in
consumption expenditures and program participation — was very different among
the JPS programs.  The employment creation programs, which relied on self-selection
targeting, were much more likely to reach those households experiencing large shocks
to their expenditure than programs based on administrative targeting such as
subsidized rice sales, scholarships, and health subsidies.  Third, larger coverage does
not lead to either better or worse targeting:  There was no general tendency across
the programs for marginal incidence to be above, or below, average incidence.
Fourth, the targeting designs of many of the programs were not followed strictly
during implementation of the programs. In practice, community and individual
characteristics — that were de jure irrelevant — played a role in targeting. In the
sales of subsidized rice program, community influence led to the program going to
many more than the eligible individuals.  In other programs, individual
characteristics appear to have influenced targeting.
                                                
# This paper is a synthesis that draws on multi-year research program of the SMERU Research Institute
and the World Bank Office in Jakarta. We draw on papers we have co-authored with Emmanuel
Skoufias, Yusuf Suharso, Wenefrida Widyanti and on a large body of quantitative and qualitative work
of SMERU as well as collaboration and conversations with Vivi Alatas, Lisa Cameron, Deon Filmer,
Ben Olken, and Menno Pradhan. We are grateful to BPS and UNICEF for use of the data. We would
like to thank Daniel Perwira for research assistance and Rachael Diprose for editing the manuscript.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Whether as the result of financial/currency crisis (Thailand, Korea, Indonesia 1997;
Russia, Ecuador 1998; Brazil 1999; Turkey 2001; Argentina 2002), delayed systemic
transformation (the countries of the FSU), or domestic difficulties (Zimbabwe 2001),
a large number of countries have experienced macroeconomic crises.  The precipitous
falls in macroeconomic aggregates are reflected in negative impacts on individuals —
both as households’ incomes fall and poverty rises, and as public spending falls
reducing available services for the poor.1 An increasingly frequent response to
macroeconomic crisis is the attempt to mitigate the worst consequences of these
shocks through crisis “safety net” programs.2  Indonesia was no different and launched
a series of crisis programs known as the JPS (Jaring Pengaman Sosial) programs.
This paper draws on several recent household data sets to present four empirical
findings about the targeting of these Indonesian crisis programs.3  Within the
extensive literature on the many aspects of targeting and benefit incidence of
government programs,4 this paper has three unique features.  First, we address the
question of the targeting of crisis programs that were created deliberately to address
the consequences of a specific economic shock.  Second, we are able to use multiple
data sources, including a panel data set spanning the crisis, to cross validate findings.
Third, we are able to make comparisons across the set of programs.
After providing brief background information on the crisis, we describe the targeting
design of five major programs: subsidized rice, student scholarships, health care
subsidies, employment creation, and community block grants in the next chapter.
Each of the following four chapters examines our empirical findings.
                                                
1 See Ravallion (2002a) on fiscal incidence of contractions.
2 See Ferreira, Prennushi, and Ravallion (1999).
3 With our focus in the paper on targeting, we do not address other important aspects of program
design and evaluation.  Design issues such as the match of administrative capacity to program
complexity, aligning implementing agency interests to program design, the ease of information
dissemination (issues in which economists have no special comparative advantage) are crucial to the
success of crisis programs, but these have been addressed elsewhere (e.g. World Bank, 2001).
Assessing program impact on household outcomes (consumption, health, school drop-out) depends on
the usual difficult issues of identifying the counter-factual (no program) outcome, which requires a
separate treatment that both we (Suryahadi et al., 2002) and others (Cameron, 2002 for education;
Saadah, Pradhan, and Sparrow, 2000 for health) have addressed elsewhere.
4 Grosh (1994) on administrative aspects, van de Walle and Nead (1995) is a good overview volume
on the issue of targeting.  The output of the cottage industry calculating benefit incidence and
targeting is well reviewed  in Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2002).
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II. THE DESIGN AND TARGETING OF THE INDONESIAN
CRISIS JPS PROGRAMS
A.  Crisis, Impact, and the Launch of the JPS
After nearly thirty years of uninterrupted rapid growth, low inflation, and a stable
currency, in August of 1997 Indonesia’s currency began to slide in what at first
appeared to be only the spillover from the crisis in Thailand.  But by May 1998 the
country was suffering from the combined effects of a currency, financial, natural,
economic, and political crisis.  The currency collapsed in waves, from its pre-crisis
level of Rp 2,200 to the dollar in mid 1997 to Rp 5,000 by October, to Rp 6,000 by
December, to a free fall in January 1998 (following the almost immediate collapse of
the second ill-fated IMF program) which took the currency as low as Rp 17,000 per
dollar.  The effect of the currency devaluation on the substantial unhedged foreign
currency denominated borrowing by both the domestic financial and corporate
sectors (on top of underlying structural weaknesses of the sector) created a financial
crisis.  The fear of widespread banking collapse caused the Central Bank to issue a
blanket guarantee of inter-bank loans in January 1998 which, in turn, spurred the
money supply to nearly triple between early 1998 and late 1999 (Deuster, 2002).  In
addition nature was unkind as fires burned out of control in large sections of Sumatra
in the fall of 1997 and a drought reduced the primary rice crop.
The combination of these impacts caused the economy to contract by an almost
unprecedented magnitude — real GDP fell 13.7 percent in 1998 and inflation
skyrocketed. The money supply expansion and currency depreciation caused
skyrocketing domestic prices particularly for food (since food is a tradable it was more
affected by the depreciation — the general inflation rate was 78 percent in 1998
while food prices escalated by 118 percent).  All of this, combined with signs of
weakness and ill health from Soeharto, led to a political crisis.  Student deaths and
rioting in the capital Jakarta and several other cities led to the May 1998 resignation
of Soeharto, who had been in power since the mid 1960s.5
The social impact of the crisis was both immediate, as well as substantial, and is still
evolving today.  Real wages of formal sector workers fell by around one third between
August 1997 and August 1998 before beginning to recover in 1999 as nominal wages
began to grow. Given the flexible labor market dominated by informal and self-
employment, officially measured open unemployment was never really the issue; it
rose only from 4.7 in August 1997, to 5.5 in 1998, and to 6.4 in 1999.6  One large
scale household survey, the “100 Villages Survey” study (see detail below), showed
                                                
5 The story of the Indonesian economic crisis and its possible proximate and deep causes has been told
many times in academic (e.g. McLeod, 1998), official (e.g. World Bank, 1999), and journalistic (e.g.
Blustein, 2001) accounts.
6 See Feridhanusetyawan (1999), Manning (2000), Papanek and Handoko (1999).
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real per capita consumption expenditures falling 17 percent between May 1997 and
August 1998.7
Our attempt to piece together a consistent series of data, on the headcount measure
of absolute consumption expenditure (ACE) poverty from all the various sources
suggests ACE poverty increased by 164 percent from the onset of the crisis in mid
1997 to its peak at the end of 1998 (Suryahadi et al., 2000).8
Figure 1: The Evolution of the Headcount Poverty Rate in Indonesia,
February 1996 to November 1999 (Sept. 1997=100)
Source: Suryahadi et al., 2000
                                                
7 The reconciliation of the national accounts fall in “real” per capita expenditures (PCE) and the
household survey based measures is due to the enormous shift in relative prices, which implies that
deflators which used a small share for food such as the CPI and the GDP deflator showed small “real”
falls, while those using food shares for the poorer households showed much larger “real” falls.
8 In July 1998 there was considerable debate as estimates of the crisis increase in ACE headcount poverty
rates ranged from as high as 30 to as low as 3 percentage points.  These attempts at “real time” estimates
suffered from a variety of methodological problems (see Poppele, Sumarto, and Pritchett, 1999).
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In the face of the economic and political instability and the enormous (and growing)
social consequences, there were both pragmatic and benign motivations for/within
the programs. First, both the new government and the international financial
institutions and bilateral agencies needed to be seen to be responding pro-actively to
the impacts of the crisis in order to sharply differentiate themselves from the past.
Second, there was a desire to mitigate the impacts of the shock on both households
and communities. Third, many were interested in protecting certain key social
services, notably health and education.  Fourth, there were Keynesian motivations to
sustain aggregate demand both nationally and locally to halt the collapse in output.
Finally, there were some who wanted to use the crisis and the new program to
reorient government attention to poverty. The outcome of the mix of those
motivations and the constraints on program design imposed by availability of data
produced a set of programs with varying targeting design.
The resignation of Soeharto in May 1998 created three inter-related difficulties: the
budget approved for the fiscal year running from April 1998 to March 1999 was no
longer operative, there needed to be a new IMF program approved (which required a
new budget), and the IMF program required the arrangement of external financing of
the government deficit.  In July 1998 such a budget was produced, which contained
(within the new FY 1998/99 budget) a line item for “safety net” or JPS (Jaring
Pengaman Sosial) programs.9  The magnitude of the budget for the JPS programs was
not the result of costing out programs or based on any historical baseline but was an
amount determined by macroeconomic, political, and financing forces with which
programs could be designed. This meant that programs needed to be designed.
However, the Indonesian people had never relied to any significant extent on
government safety net programs as prior to the crisis. The country had neither the
economic apparatus nor the political  mechanisms  (nor the inclination)  required  to
deliver large scale transfer programs all over the archipelago.10 Therefore, establishing
crisis programs in Indonesia in 1998 did not merely mean expanding an existing net,
but casting an entirely new one.
                                                
9 We will refer to the programs by the Indonesian acronym JPS because this is more neutral than the
term “safety net” — and as we dislike the “safety net” metaphor, this will save us the constant use of
scare quotes.
10 Before the crisis, Indonesia was one of the most rapidly growing economies in the world, where
“official” absolute consumption expenditure poverty fell by almost 50 percentage points (from 60 to 11
percent) between 1970 and 1996. The general poverty strategy of the previous government was: (a)
social spending, largely focused on the provision of ‘social services’ such as health, family planning,
and education, (b) “development” programs that aimed at poverty reduction through increasing
productivity (such as credit subsidies, left-behind villages program (IDT), etc), (c) some small
programs for very limited disadvantaged groups (e.g. disabled, orphans), and (d) family and
communities providing ‘mutual social insurance’ in times of difficulty  (there was some subsidized
health care, compulsory social security program, and unemployment protection  for formal sector
employees but this was of very limited reach).
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B.  Targeting the JPS Programs: Data Availability
Program targeting design needs to give a complete specification of how resources will
flow from the public sector budget to the program participants.  There are two basic
dimensions of program targeting — the geographic scope and allocation of the budget
to the relevant implementing jurisdictions of the government; and the mechanisms
for the choice of specific households/individuals which will participate.
Amongst developing countries, Indonesia is a data rich environment. It has an
annual household National Socio-Economic Survey (the SUSENAS), National
Labor Force Survey (the SAKERNAS), Survey of Manufacturing, Population
Census, Agricultural Census, Economic Census, Village Census (the PODES), and so
on. It has also a functioning administrative apparatus that reaches into every rural
village/urban neighborhood in the country.  However, while in this data rich
environment there was relatively recent information about the levels of various
regional and household indicators of well-being, there was no timely, complete, and
administratively acceptable data on the impact of the shock that would have allowed
accurate allocation of the JPS either to regions or individuals.
Regional allocations. At the time the JPS programs were being designed, it was
increasingly clear that the regional impact of the crisis was heterogeneous — and that
there was little connection between the regional distribution of the impact of the
shock and the regional distribution of pre-shock poverty.11  In particular, urban areas
on the island of Java — which were among the wealthiest areas before the crisis —
were the epicenter of the financial and modern sector crisis.  In contrast, traditionally
poorer natural resource exporting areas actually benefited from the crisis.12  Because
the crisis affected food prices, the impact on real wages and living standard spilled
over from urban to rural areas — but then differentially affected different cropping
areas (and within areas landed versus non-landed households).
The Indonesian budget process required that the actual amounts to be allocated to
each region be decided at the time the project design was approved. No money could
be spent on a project until the regional allocations were made.  The indicators of the
regional severity of the crisis that were timely, were either not complete or
administratively unacceptable. Data showing that particular areas were hard hit, or
even that, in general, urban areas were hard hit, was not exactly comparable data for
all administrative regions (provinces, districts) and hence could not be used.  Finally,
given the overall drastic reductions in real budgets (and real wages), the regional
allocation of the JPS budget was hotly contested by the regional governments and it
was impossible to use anything other than administratively generated data.
Individually available data.  In economies dominated by agriculture, self-employment,
and informal employment, there is no reliable administrative data on current income.
                                                
11 This was documented with qualitative data from a nationwide “rapid response” survey even as early
as October 1998 (see Sumarto, Wetterberg, and Pritchett, 1998).
12 On some of the outer islands, the common reaction to queries to the impact of the crisis was hidup
krismon (long live the monetary crisis) and there were anecdotes of motorbike dealers shipping their
urban inventories to (some) rural areas to meet new demand.
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For those with formal sector employment, one can talk about “losing a job” or
“becoming unemployed”, but this is not a key determinant of income or consumption
changes.  Indonesia did in fact have a household list on something like poverty that
was complete and administratively acceptable — but was not timely in that it was
about levels of long-run “prosperity”, not the impact of the crisis.
The National Family Planning Coordinating Agency (BKKBN) in Indonesia
classified every household in Indonesia into one of four levels of “prosperity”
(BKKBN 1994).  A household was in the lowest welfare category (“pre-prosperous”)
if any one of the five statements was true:  (i) the household cannot practice their
religious principles, (ii) all household members do not eat at least twice a day, (iii)
not all household members have different sets of clothing for home, work, school,
and visits, (iv) the household cannot seek modern medical assistance for sick
children and family planning services for contraceptive users, (v) the largest floor
area of house is made of earth.  This list had been compiled and updated annually by
the village level workers (cadres) of the family planning agency for use in targeting
contraceptive subsidies and efforts.13  Prior to the advent of the crisis programs there
was little incentive for either individuals to be classified as family planning poor (or
for regional governments to have a larger fraction of poor).
C.  The JPS Programs and Their De Jure Targeting Design
The outcome of the mixed motivations, political pressures, and targeting constraints
outlined above was a set of JPS programs, each with its own objectives and targeting
criteria. The Indonesian government’s approach was to group the JPS effort in five
major areas:  food security, employment creation, education, health, and community
empowerment. Table 1 summarizes the objectives, intended magnitude, and targeting
of the major JPS programs, which we describe briefly before moving on to the four
sections that describe the targeting results.
                                                
13 There is considerable uncertainty about how the cadres actually compiled the list (even after several
discussions with the cadres in various regions).  It was supposed to be based on household visits, but to say it
was based on a “survey” overstates the formality and rigor of the process.  Also the list was not centralized or
computerized, but the list of household names was maintained at the local level and the higher levels of
government only had access to summary reports of the numbers of households in each group.
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Table 1.  Summary of JPS programs
Program Description FY 98/99
Budget
billion Rp.
(US$ 100,000)a
Planned
coverage
Targeting in Fiscal Year 1998/99
Geographic NoneOPK
“subsidized rice”
Sales of subsidized
rice to targeted
households
5,450 12.8 million
KPS and KS-I
households Household BKKBN list
Geographic None, various
ministries (e.g.
Manpower,
Forestry, Public
Works)
Padat Karya
programs
“labor creation”
A loose,
uncoordinated,
collection of
several ‘labor
intensive’ programs
in a variety of
government
departments
2,066 12.7 million
man-days
Household Weak self
selection (by
wage rate, but
varied)
Geographic Data on
enrollment in
1997
SBG
“scholarships”
Providing
scholarships
directly to
elementary, lower
secondary, and
upper secondary
students and block
grants to selected
schools
1,138 6% of primary,
17% of lower
secondary,
10% of upper
secondary
school
students
Household School
committees
following criteria
Geographic BKKBN pre-
prosperous rates
JPS-BK
“health cards”
Providing subsidies
for medical
services,
operational support
for health centers,
medicine and
imported medical
equipment, family
planning services,
supplemental food,
midwife services
1,043 7.4 million
KPS
households Household BKKBN list
Geographic Pre-crisis (1997)
data on poverty
rate by district
PDM-DKE
“village block
grants”
A ‘community
fund’ program that
provides block
grants directly to
villages for either
public works or
revolving fund for
credit
1,701
Household Local decision
making
a) US$ figures are indicative only, calculated at an exchange rate of Rp 10,000/US$ dollar.
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Subsidized rice.  The largest program was a program called OPK (Operasi Pasar
Khusus)14 that allowed each eligible household to purchase 20 kilograms of rice at the
price of Rp 1,000/kg (in August 1998 the market price for medium quality rice was
around Rp 3,000/kg).15 Households were eligible if they fell into either of the two
lowest categories of the family planning agency’s “prosperity” ranking.16  A village
representative was authorized to purchase each month an allotment of rice equal to
20 kilograms times the number of eligible households in that village from the logistic
agency’s (BULOG) local warehouse.  Households then purchased this rice in the
village at the stipulated price (with some allowance for transport costs).
Labor creating programs.  Unlike the above programs that had centralized design and
implementation, the “labor creating” programs were really a diverse set of programs
operated by different ministries and with different criteria — at one point there were
seventeen different “labor creating” programs.  The unifying features were that
individuals were paid for labor services and that the principal targeting was
geographic and based on self-selection — individuals chose whether or not to work
for the specified wages.  Ferreira, Prennushi, and Ravallion (1999) stress that the
impact was highest when the programs used a relatively low wage rate, as this ensures
that only those in need work (people will take, and return to, regular employment
when available) and that as many people as possible can be employed.  This was not
always the case in the programs and there was wide variability — the drought relief
programs tended to pay wages in kind, the urban construction programs tended to
have high wages, and many programs used the government legal minimum wage,
which was higher than the market in some areas while lower in others.
Scholarships and block grants.  This program had two major components: scholarships
to individual students and block grants to schools, which, although it was an
important part of the program, we do not examine its targeting issues.17 Scholarships
were provided for three levels: primary (SD), lower secondary (SLTP), and upper
secondary school (SMU).  The scholarship amount was substantial (Rp. 10,000, Rp.
20,000, and Rp. 30,000 per month for primary, lower secondary, and upper secondary
school students respectively). This was intended to exceed both official and unofficial
school fees.  The scholarships were paid directly to the students (or their families)
twice a year via a cash transfer handled by the local post office.
                                                
14 This means “special market operation”, which was meant to distinguish these sales of rice by the
logistics agency from their traditional market operations in which they bought and sold rice to stabilize
prices.
15 See ‘Recent Volatility in the Rice Market: Results of a SMERU Rapid Appraisal in Central and East
Java’, SMERU Newsletter, No. 01, November 1998.
16 Originally only the lowest category (KPS) was eligible. In response to reports that due to the
prolonged economic crisis many KS-I households had fallen into KPS, the government expanded
eligibility to include KS-I households. In effect, this increased the number of target from 7.3 to 12.8
million households (see Rahayu et al., 1998).
17 Since the block grants were targeted to schools, at least conceivable we could examine the incidence
of this program by examining the children who were in schools who received block grants — but
households were not asked this in any of the available data sets.
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Each school received a number of scholarships, which they allocated to students by a
school committee, consisting of the principal, a teacher representative, a student
representative, the head of parent’s association (BP3, as the representative of the
local community), and the village head. The scholarship recipients were selected
according to their score on an administrative criteria, the main element of which was
that the child came from a household in the lowest two categories of the family
planning “prosperity” status, but which also included the size of the family, the
likelihood of a student dropping out, and the constraint that 50 percent of the
scholarships went to girls.  The decisions had to be approved by the committee.18
Health.  One major health program was the provision of a health card (kartu sehat) to
eligible households which entitled all members of the household to obtain free
services from designated public health care centers for medical and family planning
purposes, and services for ante-natal and child birth services from designated
providers.19 Household eligibility in this program was based on village level lists,
which primarily encompassed family planning prosperity status, with some
modifications by local administration via a “health committee”. While health
services were to be provided free, the health units were not reimbursed for the
provision of those services. Rather there was a complicated financing scheme where,
among other features, local clinic funds received through the program were based on
the number of health card holders in their administrative area and could only be used
for certain items.
                                                
18 The criteria were explicit and disseminated to the schools. In principle, students selected to receive
the scholarships were supposed to be from the poorest backgrounds. As a guidance, scholarships were
to be allocated to children from household in the two lowest BKKBN rankings at first. If there were a
large number of eligible students such that not all of the poor students could receive a scholarship,
then additional indicators were used to identify the neediest students. These additional indicators
included living far from school, having physical handicaps, and those coming from large or single
parent families. The only subjective input was school committee’s assessment of the recipients’
probability to drop out of schools without scholarships.
19 This was primarily the primary health care clinics (Puskesmas) but also included some but not all
services at a hospital.  This aspect of all services at some levels but only some services at others created
a fair bit of confusion as health card holders felt they were being denied or charged for what should
have been free services.  
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D. Data Sources Used to Examine Targeting: Program Participation and
Consumption
We used two principal sources to examine the targeting of the JPS programs: the
national household survey (SUSENAS) and a panel survey carried out by BPS and
UNICEF called the “100 Villages Survey”. The SUSENAS is a nationally
representative household survey covering over 200,000 households in each of the
countries 341 districts.20
The 100 Villages Survey is a panel with five rounds:  May 1997 (pre-crisis), August
1998, December 1998, May 1999 and October 1999.  The May 1997 round of the
100 Village Survey interviewed 120 households in each of ten villages in ten districts
purposively chosen to represent various disadvantaged economic types (e.g. fishing
villages, remote).  In subsequent rounds 80 of the original 120 households in each
village were re-interviewed to create a panel of around 8,000 households.21
JPS module.  A module which asked households about their awareness of,
participation in, and benefits from the JPS programs was fielded in December 1998
round of the 100 Villages Survey, and then a substantially expanded version was
included in the February 1999 SUSENAS.  The module, particularly in the 100
Villages Survey, asked whether households reported “participating” or “receiving
benefits” from the JPS programs in the last three months.
Consumption module.  The “short form” questions on consumption expenditures were
used in both the core SUSENAS as well as the 100 Villages survey, and the
consumption expenditures aggregate based on these questions was used throughout,
with the exception in the footnote.22
                                                
20 For the five levels of the administrative jurisdictions of Indonesia as of February 1999, we use the words:
national, provincial (26, excluding East Timor), district (341), sub-district (4,044), village (roughly
68,783).  Unless otherwise noted “districts” denotes the “level II local government” which includes both
kabupaten (rural districts) and kota (cities that are districts).  Unless otherwise specified, “village” includes
both rural desa and urban kelurahan (note the Indonesian desa is not a “village” in the sense of a self-
contained cluster of residences but is an administrative jurisdiction that may include several such clusters).
21 In the original survey the 120 households were 60 from each of two census enumeration areas within
the village.  In the later rounds this was changed to 40 from each of three enumeration areas.  Forty
panel households in each enumeration area were chosen from the sixty original households, but by a
process in which attrition was not documented: if a panel selected household was not present then
another was chosen to have a complete panel. Since the rounds are relatively close together we
believe that actual attrition was small but the caveat persists that the results are for those households
located in subsequent rounds and are hence not representative of all households.
22 There was actually a big problem with the SUSENAS data because in 1999 the detailed
“consumption module” was administered to 65,000 households.  While in theory these households also
received the short-form consumption questions, it turns out that those households who received both
the short form and detailed module set of questions had much higher recorded consumption than those
households only asked the core questions (suggesting the prompted recall of the detailed module
produced higher consumption and the enumerators translated this over into the matching categories
of the short-form).  Therefore we create separate quintiles for core and module households (see
Sumarto, Suryahadi, and Widyanti, 2001).
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III. JPS PROGRAM PARTICIPATION INCIDENCE:
(MILDLY) PROGRESSIVE, REMARKABLY UNIFORM
A.  Empirical Findings
Since we cannot estimate the actual magnitude of the benefit from each of the
programs, we focused on “participation incidence.” We define a program’s (static)
participation incidence as the relationship between program coverage and household
per capita expenditures. The coverage ratio (CR) of the jth JPS program in the ith
region for the qth group of consumption expenditures (usually quintiles or deciles or,
more broadly, any range of centiles such as poor vs. non-poor) is the fraction of those
households in the region in the given group who report having participated in the
program in the recall period.
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We compute the coverage ratio separately for each district.  This is for two reasons.
First, we wish to avoid comparisons of “real” income across districts which, given the
lack of comparable price data across urban and rural areas in Indonesia, we regard as
still problematic.  Second, rather than conflating the issues of how well the
geographic targeting identified regions and how well within regions the programs
reached poorer household, we only examine how well programs targeted households
relative only to other households within those regions. The summary statistics are not
the national average targeting, but the average of targeting within districts.
Given the coverage ratios across the quintiles we can calculate three summary
indicators of participation incidence that reflect consumption expenditure targeting.
First, the ratio of the coverage of the middle to the poorest quintile:
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Second, the same ratio of coverage ratios for the richest (QV) to poorest (QI)
quintile.  Third, we define the “targeting ratio” (TR) as the ratio of the fraction of
the benefits of a program received by the non-poor relative to the fraction of the
non-poor in the population:
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This definition is compatible with either an absolute consumption expenditure
(ACE) definition of poverty (which produces as an outcome the fraction of the
population in any given region poor and non-poor) or with the use of consumption
expenditure percentiles.  We implement the targeting ratio by defining the bottom
20 percent of households by per capita consumption expenditures in each district as
the region’s “poor.”
If a program were untargeted in its availability, and the uptake was not related to
expenditures, then all of the targeting indicators (QIII/QI, QV/QI, TR) would be
equal to 1 (on average).  We can also define the best imaginable targeting indicators
(lower is better targeting) as the targeting indicators that would result if program
participation were strictly ordered by consumption expenditures.  In this case the
graph of participation incidence would be step function equal to one up to some
threshold level of expenditure (which is a function of total program budget/coverage)
and zero thereafter.
Table 2 reports the average coverage and the targeting indicators from the February
1999 SUSENAS — along with the maximum imaginable coverage of the bottom
quintile and best imaginable targeting indicators. The targeting glass is definitely
either half-full or half-empty.  On the half-full side, all of the programs demonstrate
some “pro-poor” targeting.  A household in the middle quintile was only 59 percent
(medical services) to 80 percent (subsidized rice) as likely as a household in the
bottom quintile to have received benefits.  Households in the top quintile of
expenditures were only around 30 percent (medical services, employment creation)
to 46 percent (subsidized rice) as likely to have participated in the JPS. The targeting
ratios were consistently better than a uniform transfer (which is itself progressive
relative to the pre-tax/transfer distribution).
Table 2.  Average targeting of various JPS programs across districts of Indonesia
SUSENAS, Feb 1999
Maximum imaginable coverage and best
imaginable expenditure targeting
(uniform transfer=1)
Ratio Ratio
Program
Quintile I
Coverage QIII/QI QV/QI
Targeting
Ratio
Quintile I
coverage Q3/qi Q5/q1
Targeting
Ratio
Subsidized Rice
52.64 0.79 0.46 0.92 100.00 0.63 0.00 0.78
Employment
Creation 8.31 0.70 0.30 0.88 41.55 0.00 0.00 0.00
Primary
Scholarship 5.80 0.69 0.35 0.89 29.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lower Secondary
Scholarship 12.15 0.69 0.40 0.89 60.75 0.00 0.00 0.00
Upper Secondary
Scholarship 5.40 0.61 0.36 0.90 27.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Used Health Card
10.60 0.59 0.29 0.83 53.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:  a) Based on the unweighted average across districts.
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On the half empty side, the lack of perfect targeting meant that coverage amongst
the poorest was much less than imaginable.  Had the “health card” been strictly
targeted by expenditures, 53 percent of the bottom quintile could have received the
program — whereas only 10.6 percent of the poorest quintile actually did (and
similarly for other programs).  The targeting ratios suggest that participation of the
non-poor (defined as the top 80 percent of the population) in JPS programs was
about 90 percent of their share in the population.  About 75 percent of all program
participants were not in the bottom 20 percent of the expenditure distribution.
The results in table 2 are averages across districts, which conceal the enormous
differences across districts in the measured targeting.  While part of this variability is
sampling error (the median sample size by district was 606 households), there appears
to be substantial variation in the extent to which the programs reached the poorest
in each district (we return to this below).  Table 3 shows that in each program,
roughly half the districts have either uniform or pro-rich targeting while roughly half
had targeting substantially better than a uniform transfer.23
Table 3.  Distribution of targeting ratios across the districts of Indonesia
Percent of districts in each targeting ratio class
Program Mean TR Std Dev <0.7
(sharply
pro-poor)
0.7-0.9
(pro-poor)
0.9-1.1
(near
uniform)
>1.1
(anti-poor)
Total
Subsidized rice 0.91 0.10 2.39 38.57 57.00 2.05 100
Employment
creation
0.87 0.27 23.02 26.98 32.01 17.99 100
Primary
scholarship
0.86 0.26 20.73 31.64 34.55 13.09 100
Lower secondary
scholarship
0.86 0.25 23.10 28.16 35.38 13.36 100
Upper secondary
scholarship
0.86 0.38 33.47 14.88 14.05 37.60 100
Used Health
Cards
0.83 0.29 25.69 35.42 20.14 18.75 100
Source:  Author’s calculations based on February 1999 SUSENAS.
Even though the programs had very different administrative and targeting designs,
the participation incidence of the various JPS programs appears remarkably similar.
While there are differences in the targeting indicators (the range of QIII/QI
(middle/poor) ratios is 20 percentage points (0.59 to 0.79)), the JPS program
incidence is similar when compared to the benefit incidence of other general,
                                                
23 This heterogeneity of targeting performance across regions with the same project design is similar to
the finding in Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2002) that across the range of programs they examine
there were large variations across countries within the same type of program.
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untargeted, government expenditures.24 Figure 2 compares the participation
incidence of the JPS programs to the spending on education (primary, junior
secondary, upper secondary), health (PHCs, hospitals, the nutritional program), and
the subsidy to kerosene. While the JPS programs were not perfectly targeted to
consumption expenditures, they stand out as being similarly well targeted relative to
these categories of general expenditures.  Only spending on primary education has
anything like the incidence of the JPS programs.25
B.  Interpretations
The joint finding that the JPS programs were mildly progressively targeted to
households with low consumption expenditures and that the degree of targeting was
similar across programs raises two related questions:  (a) why were the programs
targeted as they were, and (b) what accounts for the similarity in the targeting. There
are three possible explanations.  First, the data did not exist that would have allowed
the programs to be targeted to consumption expenditures and the programs were
similar because they shared targeting criteria.  Second, targeting household’s current
                                                
24 And these are categories that are generally thought to be desirable and reasonably well targeted —
we do not even include items that are obviously biased towards the rich:  tertiary education, gasoline
subsidies, the bailout of the banks in the financial crisis (World Bank, 2001).
25 And this is driven at least in part by the arbitrary assumption of zero economies of scale in household
consumption (e.g. that households are ranked by θN
esExpenditurTotal
, θ=1).  Since larger
household have more children, even if all children are enrolled in public schooling and hence the
subsidy is equal per child, the assumption makes it appear that more of the benefit accrues to poor
households by making larger households appear poorer.  With θ=1 the QIII/QI ratio is 0.835, but if the
economy of scale parameter assumes empirically plausible values the benefit appears much more
uniform:  at θ=0.8 QIII/QI=0.888, at θ=0.6 then QIII/QI=0.984.
Figure 2:  JPS Participation Incidence versus Benefit Incidence of 
Education, Health, Kerosene Subsidy
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consumption expenditures was not really the program objective and consumption
expenditures are only weakly related to those objectives. Third, the underlying
political economy precludes sharp targeting.
The first potential explanation is that the household targeting in several of the
programs relied on the family planning classification and that this classification was
only weakly related to consumption expenditures.  This explanation has some pluses
and minuses.  The “prosperity” classification is only weakly related to expenditures.
Table 4 compares those who were “poor” and “non-poor” by ACE poverty and the
family planning classification.  The fact that 57 percent of those who were family
planning poor were also ACE poor implies some association between the two, but
also implies fully that 43 percent of the family planning poor were not ACE poor.  By
the same token, only 57 percent of those who were ACE poor were also family
planning poor.26
Table 4.  The association between the administrative data on household poverty
(family planning agency “pre-prosperous”) and ACE poverty
Poora Non-Poor Total
Number of Pre-Prosperous households 3,357 2,523 5,880
Percent of “Pre-Prosperous” households
who are:
57.1 42.9 100.0
Percent of households who are “pre-
prosperous” (by poor/non-poor)
57.0 41.3 49.0
Total 5,889 6,108 11,997
% Row 49.0a 51.0 100.0
Source:  Based on Suryahadi, Suharso, and Sumarto (1999).
a The poverty line is chose so that ACE headcount poverty equals the proportion
“preprosperous”.
However, it is not clear that the weak association between family planning
“prosperity” status and consumption expenditures is the explanation for the similarly
mild JPS program targeting by expenditure, for two reasons.  First, even for the
subsidized rice program, in which the family planning classification was the only
criteria, the 100 Villages Survey data show only a weak connection between family
planning “prosperity” status and receiving OPK rice.  Table 5 shows that in the ten
                                                
26 This lack of association is worrisome, but there is no obvious conclusion one way or the other.  On
the one hand, there has been a long literature arguing that both because of more accurate
measurement and because of purposive consumption smoothing by households, current consumption
expenditures are a better proxy for household’s long-run income than is current income.  But on the
other, consumption expenditures has its own problems as a proxy of long-run household standard of
living and it may well be that an asset based proxy like the family planning method provides a
reasonable indicator of long-run welfare. Filmer and Pritchett (2001) show that a principal
components based index based on asset ownership (e.g. owning a bicycle) and housing characteristics
(e.g. having a toilet) performs at least as well as consumption expenditures in predicting child school
attainment.
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districts of the 100 Villages Survey the median coverage of those apparently not
eligible (the family planning “prosperous”) was 70 percent of those eligible and the
targeting ratio is only 0.85.  This is no better targeting (in fact, a bit worse, 0.7 versus
0.54) than if the ratio of non-poor coverage is computed on a comparable basis using
consumption expenditures (final column of table 6).27  This suggests that the program
was as weakly targeted according to the administrative eligibility criteria as according
to consumption expenditures — which corresponds to observations about actual
program administration (see Chapter VI).
Table 5.  Evidence from the 100 Villages Survey about the relationship between
observed family planning agency “poverty” (BKKBN KPS) and OPK program
participation
Maximum Imaginable
Targeting
District
Percent
BKKBN“P
oor”
(KPS)
Coverage
of the
“BKKBNpo
or” (KPS)
Ratio of
coverage of
Non-poor
to poor
(KPS/PS)
Targeting
Ratio
(proportion
to non-
poor/non-
poor in
population)
Maximum
coverage of
“poor”
(KPS)
Minimum
Targeting
Ratio
Coverage of
consumption
expenditure
Non-
poor/poor1
Banjarnegara, Central
Java 60.33 91.16 0.91 0.95 100.0 0.79 0.83a
Indragiri Hilir, Riau 41.42 23.54 0.51 0.72 40.6 0.00 0.36 b
Karang Asem, Bali 37.42 20.27 1.34 1.10 65.7 0.00 0.45 b
Kendari, Southeast
Sulawesi 76.08 62.87 0.48 0.55 72.4 0.00 0.53 c
Kupang, East Nusa
Tenggara 75.04 41.94 0.51 0.58 49.1 0.00 0.50 c
Kutai, East
Kalimantan
19.93
21.34 0.72 0.93 83.3 0.00 3.58 d
Lampung Selatan,
Lampung 59.75 49.65 0.88 0.92 79.1 0.00 0.81a
Pandeglang, West
Java
27.25
23.24 0.33 0.64 43.4 0.00 0.68 b
Rembang, Central
Java
61
87.98 0.67 0.77 100.0 0.52 0.56a
Sumedang, West Java 31.92 7.83 1.98 1.19 41.0 0.00 0.48b
Median: 0.70 0.85 0.54
Source:  Based on Suryahadi, Suharso, and Sumarto (1999), tables 2a and 2b.
Using the quintiles corresponding most closely to the fraction “pre-prosperous” (KPS) as the “non-poor”
depending on the BKKBN poverty rate in teach district for this with (a) we use QI-QIII at the consumption
expenditure poor, while for other districts it is (b) QI-QII, (c) QI-QIV poor, (d) QI poor.
                                                
27 Cameron (2002) shows that in the 100 Villages Survey data using the self-reported BKKBN status,
the scholarships also did not strictly follow the classification, as the proportion of households receiving
scholarships (either PS, JSS, USS) was: KPS 11.6%, KS-I 7.11%, KS-II 6.52%, KS-III and above
1.22%.  She also finds that in explaining scholarship receipt, the level and change expenditures were
statistically significant, even controlling for BKKBN status.
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This weak relationship between family planning agency poverty and OPK receipt
suggests that even though the program nominally used this criteria in targeting, this
likely does not account for the similarity in program incidence. Table 6 shows the
relationship (in the October 1999 round of the 100 Villages Survey) between
whether a household reports receiving a health card (which provided eligibility for
free medical services) and having received OPK rice.  Even by October 1999 the
health card program coverage was still much smaller than OPK (12.4 percent versus
56.1 percent).  Interestingly, only 1.9 percent of households did have a health card
but did not receive rice, so only 15 percent of health card recipients did not receive
rice. But the converse is not true:  only one in five households who received rice also
had a health card.
Table 6.  Relationship between participation in two JPS programs (subsidized rice
and health cards) which both used family planning poverty (BKKBN PS) status as
an eligibility criteria
HH received Subsidized Rice (OPK) 
 Yes No Total
Yes 1,121(10.54)
202
(1.90)
1,323
(12.43)
No 4,850
(45.58)
4,467
(41.98)
9,317
(87.57)
 
HH Received
Health
Card
 Total 5,971(56.12)
4,669
(43.88)
10,640
(100.00)
Source:  October 1999 round of 100 Villages Survey.
While the family planning classification was a de jure element of eligibility for several
of the programs, this does not entirely account for the similar mild program
participation incidence according to consumption expenditures.  While it is true the
family planning criteria are only weakly related to consumption expenditures (Table
4), the family planning poverty criteria were not followed so closely so as to produce
program incidence similarity (Tables 5 and 6).
The second explanation of the mild relationship of program participation to
consumption expenditures is that the JPS programs were not intended to be
exclusively targeted to the consumption expenditure poor.  The targeting of each JPS
program must be assessed relative to the complex mix of actual objectives, not merely
the idealized or rhetorical objectives.28  At least three classes of objectives that could
                                                
28 While occasionally there was a simplistic statement that the JPS programs were intended to “reduce
poverty”, more frequently the government and donor descriptions said something like the JPS
programs were intended to “reduce poverty, mitigate the social impact, maintain human capital
investment and sustain employment” (TKPPJPS, 1999), which was reflective of the true range of
program objectives.
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account for only mild expenditure targeting played a role in the design and targeting
of the JPS programs.29
First, the education and health programs were intended to avert specific adverse
outcomes (drop-out, worsening health status) not to reduce ACE poverty, as the
protection of household’s consumption/investment of certain “merit goods” was
regarded as a concern independent of poverty.  Therefore nothing about the programs
being strongly or weakly targeted, with respect to expenditures, can be used to infer
whether the programs were targeted as designed, or whether that design was optimal
relative to its objective.  That is, there should be no confusion between “targeting
leakage” in the sense that households with high consumption expenditure received
program benefits and “administrative leakage” in the sense that program benefits
were diverted from the intended recipients.  For instance, the scholarships program
has had close, independent monitoring which suggests that the targeting procedures
were adhered to reasonably closely in designating the individual students to receive
the scholarships.
One cannot infer from “weak” expenditure targeting that the program was not
implemented as designed.  Moreover, it is possible that in a program perfectly
targeted to avert drop-out, the targeting would be only weakly related to expenditures
because expenditures are only a weak predictor of drop-out.  In fact, Cameron (2002)
uses the 100 Villages Survey data to show that although the level and change in
expenditures had some explanatory power for primary school drop-out, neither of
these were actually statistically significant in predicting lower secondary or upper
secondary drop out.  But the “perfectly targeted to drop-out” explanation of the weak
relationship to expenditures is made suspect by the fact that Cameron (2002) finds
no impact of scholarships on primary or upper secondary school drop-out and only a
modest impact in lower secondary schools (3.5 percent).
Second, an explicit “non-poverty” objective of the employment creation program was
to mitigate the loss of household income — even for non-poor households.  Since the
family planning poverty classification was essentially “static” — both because it was
updated only once a year and many of the criteria are based on relatively persistent
criteria (housing conditions, clothing ownership) — it could easily miss large changes
in household welfare.
Third, there were a number of other objectives of the JPS programs that militated
against sharp targeting. By late 1998 it was felt that a problem in Indonesia was
insufficient fiscal stimulus and that the government deficit was not large enough on a
cyclically corrected basis and hence that the government should increase spending.
This meant that being able to rapidly disburse relatively large amounts of purchasing
power in order to maintain adequate absorption was an additional JPS program
objective. Programs which disbursed money for immediate labor creation (especially
in a regionally balanced way) were attractive. The JPS programs were being designed
                                                
29 The existence of the JPS programs owed a great deal to the politically driven desire of both the
government and the international financial institutions to be seen to be acting in this area, but did not
determine design.
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literally in the shadow of burned out buildings and with ongoing protests and hence
there was a desire to design programs that could generate political support.30
The final possible explanation of the mild (better than uniform but not sharply pro-
poor) and similar expenditure targeting of the JPS programs is that some mix of
national and local political economy considerations preclude sharp expenditure
targeting (Gelbach and Pritchett, 2002). If this is the case, then while some targeting
will produce a pro-poor distribution of benefits, it is possible there is no program
design that would produce a substantially more targeted distribution of benefits than
that observed.  If this is the case then some targeting mechanisms will produce more
progressive benefit incidence than no targeting, but no de jure targeting design would
be able to produce extremely sharp targeting (except perhaps for very small programs)
as it would be thwarted politically — we return to this issue in the final section.
                                                
30 In addition to the above, which we suspect are quite universal in the launch of crisis programs, we
also suspect that the interests of agencies and units of the government played a considerable role in
the composition of the JPS programs.  Three instances are worth mentioning.  One, the logistics
agency (BULOG) had a long history of price stabilization activity in basic staples, but was under fire
for having been deeply involved in a fair bit of corrupt activity in connection with the monopoly in
trade in certain commodities (in connection with the first family).  Many people (including the IMF
and World Bank) were recommending not just an end to the monopoly restrictions in items like wheat
flour but also abolition of the agency itself.  A second example is that with the budget under pressure,
the only avenue for protecting existing programs or gaining incremental revenue was to classify the
activities as under the umbrella of JPS.  In this way agencies had the incentive to simply re-label any
activity that used labor as a “labor creating” program.  A third example is that the take home pays of
local officials depended in complicated ways on the implementation of “development budget”
programs.  Since nearly all new investment was being cut from the budget, this meant that unless local
officials were responsible for the implementation of JPS programs in the development budget, their
own effective take home pays would be cut.
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IV.  DYNAMIC VERSUS STATIC PARTICIPATION
INCIDENCE: SAFETY NETS VERSUS SAFETY ROPES
A.  Empirical Findings
As has been emphasized in recent literature on the changes in poverty status over
time (Baulch and Hoddinott, 2000; Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; Jalan and Ravallion,
2000), the change in the average poverty rate masks enormous “churning” as
households move in and out of poverty.  All of the panel surveys in Indonesia show
enormous volatility in poverty rates over this period (for the IFLS see Frankenberg,
Thomas, and Beegle, 1999). Table 7 shows the pattern of changes in household
poverty status across four rounds of the 100 Villages Survey spanning 14 months.
While 42 percent of this population were never poor, 58 percent were ACE poor at
least once — even though only less than a third of that figure were always poor (17.5
percent) and the average poverty rate was 37 percent. While at least some substantial
fraction of the measured changes in household consumption reflect the difficulty of
measuring expenditures accurately, this also reflects the large changes in households
fortunes even over short periods of time — as households gain and lose jobs, harvests
are good or bad, business goes well or badly.
This volatility creates the demand not just for transfer programs to those whose
incomes are chronically low (safety nets), but also for informal and formal
insurance — like mechanisms and programs that would pay off not only when
income was absolutely low, but also when households experienced negative shocks
(safety ropes).31
Static participation incidence is the relationship between program participation and
the level of expenditure.  Graphically the coverage ratio is the height at any given
level (or range) of expenditures and hence the targeting is the slope (either at a point
or over a range, such as comparing coverage for different quintiles).  The exact
analogy can be made for dynamic participation incidence as a relationship between
program participation and changes (absolute or proportionate) in consumption
expenditures (or income).  Figure 3 shows the exact analogy of the static participation
incidence in Figure 2, i.e. showing the relationship between JPS program
participation in December 1998 and the natural log change in household per person
expenditures between May 1997 and August 1998.  Unlike static incidence the
dynamic incidence is very different across the programs.  Only for the employment
creation programs were households substantially more likely to participate if they
experienced a bad shock to consumption expenditures.
                                                
31 Sumarto, Suryahadi, and Pritchett (2000).
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Table 7.  The patterns of changes in household poverty status
Poverty Status in:
Pattern of
poverty status Aug ’98 Dec ’98 May ’99 Oct ’99
Household
Frequency
(%)
Always poor Poor Poor Poor Poor 17.5
Poor Poor Poor Non-poor 4.6
Poor Poor Non-poor Poor 2.0
Poor Non-poor Poor Poor 2.9
Three times
poor
(12.0%)
Non-poor Poor Poor Poor 2.5
Poor Poor Non-poor Non-poor 3.7
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 3.0
Poor Non-poor Non-poor Poor 1.4
Non-poor Poor Poor Non-poor 1.7
Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor 1.0
Twice poor
(12.4%)
Non-poor Non-poor Poor Poor 1.6
Poor Non-poor Non-poor Non-poor 7.9
Non-poor Poor Non-poor Non-poor 3.2
Non-poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 2.7
Once poor
(15.9%)
Non-poor Non-poor Non-poor Poor 2.1
Never poor Non-poor Non-poor Non-poor Non-poor 42.2
Source:  Widyanti, Sumarto, and Suryahadi, 2001, table 3.
Figure 3:  Dynamic Participation Incidence of the JPS Programs
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Different programs can have different coverage and targeting performances, with
respect to expenditure levels and shocks.32 Hence one program’s incidence graph
could be steep with respect to expenditures at all levels of shock, flat (non-targeted)
with respect shocks, or vice versa. A pure “safety rope” program could be sharply
targeted with respect to shocks but flat in the expenditures dimension. Figures 4a and
4b show the combined static and dynamic participation incidence for two of the
programs: OPK and employment creation. Not surprisingly, the self-selection
program has enormously better dynamic benefit incidence than the administratively
targeted OPK program as households who need assistance have an easier time
accessing program benefits.33
                                                
32 The graph of participation incidence including both levels and changes in (natural log) consumption
expenditure is a three dimensional surface.
33 This suggests that the screening argument for the use of “workfare” requirements (Besley and Coate,
1992) appears to work well in changes but no in levels.  These results contrasting the labor creating
schemes to other programs are in some ways similar and in some ways different from findings about the
public employment scheme TRABAJAR in Argentina (Jalan and Ravallion 2002, Ravallion 2002b).
They find that TRBAJAR was much better targeted in static benefit incidence — 76 percent of
participants were from households in the bottom quintile — and had much better benefit incidence
than other “protected” expenditures.
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B.  Interpretations
The now ubiquitous metaphor of a “social safety net” conflates two distinct objectives
in the design of transfer programs.  One objective might be to minimize a measure of
income or expenditure poverty.34  An alternative objective might be to mitigate risk —
reduce household vulnerability to the wide variety of potential adverse shocks they
could face (death, accident, fire, crop loss, job loss) — whether or not the shocks
push households below some absolute threshold.  If the targeting of social programs is
judged exclusively on poverty or benefit incidence based on a cross sectional
snapshot, then risk mitigation programs benefiting households who have suffered
large shocks but who are not “poor” may appear to have large “leakage” (a type II
targeting error, reaching people who are not intended beneficiaries) when in fact
they are simply serving an alternative social objective.
                                                
34 This general definition of poverty covers any of the class of Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) measures
of poverty which adjust for the intensity or depth of poverty and is consistent with either absolute or
relative poverty lines.
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The undifferentiated metaphor of “safety net” can also confuse thinking about the
political economy of transfer programs.35 Government may want to implement “safety
net” and “safety rope” programs for completely different reasons.36  While a “safety
net” program might be more popular the more effectively it transfers from richer to
poorer households, a “safety rope” program might cause little net redistribution but be
popular because it serves an important insurance function in transferring resources
from good states to bad states.
Designing programs that deal with shocks to income (either at the economy wide or
individual level) requires mechanisms that allow individuals to be added to program
participation dynamically.  This requires either self-selection targeting or “open”
administrative criteria — that is, the eligibility criteria need to have a mechanism for
households to be added (and subtracted).
                                                
35 In OECD countries, the distinction has been used to characterize different “systems”, that is those
that rely on means testing versus those that provide universal benefits (Esping-Andersen, 1990;
Goodin et al., 1999).
36  Economists would recommend poverty programs to a hypothetical benign social welfare maximizer
if the social welfare function was built up from individual (household) utility functions with declining
marginal utility, in which case a (costless) transfer from rich to poor is not a Pareto improvement but
does raise social welfare. There is also an argument for poverty programs from an externality in
altruism.  In contrast, the normative case for government involvement in mitigation of risk is based on
the argument that, if moral hazard and adverse selection are sufficiently large then welfare improving
markets for insurance against these risks will not exist (and they will be “too small” in any case).  This
is potentially the case in a wide variety of insurance markets — but particularly affect the market for
insurance of incomes.
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V. MARGINAL AND AVERAGE INCIDENCE IN THE JPS
PROGRAMS
In an important paper Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) stress that for decisions about
program expansion, the relevant incidence measure is the marginal not average
incidence.  In what they characterize as “early” capture programs, the non-poor are
more likely to receive benefits than the poor from the beginning of the program.37  If
this is so then marginal incidence will be higher than average incidence.  An
example might be secondary education in which the richer households are likely to
be the first to enroll, so at low levels average incidence will be regressive. However as
schooling moves towards universality, the incremental child is likely to be from a
poorer household than the average child already enrolled, so the marginal incidence
will be more progressive than average incidence.  In contrast, with “late” capture, the
program is well targeted to the poor at low levels of coverage but as the program
expands the marginal incidence is worse than average and hence targeting falls.
A.  Empirical Findings
We find no systematic pattern of either “early” or “late” capture in the Indonesian
JPS programs:38  (a) larger programs were not systematically more or less targeted than
smaller programs; (b) within the JPS programs, districts with higher coverage had
only a weak tendency to have worse static participation incidence (as measures by
the targeting ratio); (c) as programs evolved over time, they did not become more or
less targeted.
Coverage and targeting across programs.  Looking at Table 2 one can see that programs
with higher total coverage did not in fact have better targeting.  OPK was
substantially larger than any of the programs, but the targeting was roughly equal.
Coverage and targeting across regions.  The substantial regional variation in the
resources available for each program (principally driven by the geographic targeting
rules) created substantial variation in the coverage across regions for the same
programs.  If incidence is a function of coverage then, ),( jjj ZCRfTR =  and if more
goes to the expenditure poor as coverage expands then the targeting ratio would fall
( 0<
∂
∂
CR
TR
), while if there is “late” capture then the targeting ratio should rise as
coverage expands ( 0>
∂
∂
CR
TR
).
                                                
37 “Early” and “late” do not necessarily imply timing, it could also be “small” and “large” in a cross
section.
38 We should point out that our “targeting ratios” results are not based on the same measure as the
“targeting differential” (TD) given by the difference between per-capita allocations to the poor versus
non-poor used in Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999).
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Table 8 examines this issue in two ways and shows that there is some consistent, but
weak, evidence of “late” capture — targeting ratios generally were higher (less
targeted) in regions where program coverage was larger.  But the impact is very weak:
in a power series approximation to a non-parametric regression, the total explanatory
power of all transformations of the coverage ratios is between 3 and 8 percent of the
variation across districts in targeting. Moving from low to moderate coverage (5 to 15
percent) increased the targeting ratio (made programs less targeted) by between 0.03
(Rice, Employment) to 0.06 to 0.08 (the scholarship programs).  So, there is some
evidence that the programs did a modestly better job of limiting the benefits to the
poor at very low levels of coverage.
Table 8.  The (weak) relationship between targeting ratios and program coverage
A)  Mean and Standard Deviation (in parenthesis) of Targeting Ratio By Groups of Coverage
Scholarships
Coverage Ratio (%) OPK EmploymentCreation Primary Junior Senior
Health
CR< 5 0.87(0.21)
0.86
(0.33)
0.84
(0.30)
0.81
(0.34)
0.83
(0.45)
0.82
(0.35)
5 < CR <10 0.92(0.12)
0.86
(0.15)
0.92
(0.10)
0.90
(0.22)
0.90
(0.26)
0.82
(0.22)
10 < CR <20 0.87(0.11)
0.89
(0.11)
0.91
(0.08)
0.89
(0.13)
0.89
(0.25)
0.86
(0.14)
CR > 20 0.93
(0.06)
0.93
(0.57)
0.88
(0.05)
0.92
(0.10)
0.95
(0.15)
0.90
(0.74)
Total 0.91
(0.10)
0.87
(0.27)
0.86
(0.26)
0.86
(0.25)
0.86
(0.38)
0.83
(0.29)
B)  Results of non-parametric regression of Targeting Ratio on Coverage Across districts1
R2 of regression .115 .007 .055 .052 .008 .053
Predicted Targeting ratio at
CR=5% 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.82 0.86 0.81
Predicted Taregeting ratio
at CR=15%
0.89 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.87
Change in predicted TR
from 10 percentage point
increase in coverage
(positive is weaker
targeting)
0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.08 0.06 0.06
1) Since we are completely agnostic about the functional form (we have no reason to
believe the relationship is linear) we estimate a functional form that includes
powers and transformations of the coverage ratio.  This can be thought of as a
non-parametric approximation to any functional form.  Since the slope is not
constant we simply calculate the change across two points to give an “arc slope.”
jjjjjjjj CRCRCRCRCRCRTR εβββββββ +++++++= )ln()/1(**** 6544332210
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Figure 5 shows the graph of the targeting ratio and the coverage ratio across districts.
The principal relationship between coverage and targeting is that programs in
districts with very low coverage show, not surprisingly, very variable results in the
targeting ratio.  In districts with few recipients at times all benefits went to non-poor
households and at times all benefits went to poor households (TR=0).
Coverage and targeting over time.  The 100 Villages Survey asked households about JPS
participation in the Dec 1998 to October 1999 rounds, which allows some
examination of the dynamics of targeting during the expansion in program coverage
in the subsidized rice and health card (medical services) programs.39  As Lanjouw and
                                                
39 The scholarship program was at full scale from its beginning and the employment creation programs
actually contracted over this period.
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Figure 5:  Relationship between Targeting Ratio and Total Coverage
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Ravallion (1999) explain, with early capture (in which richer households receive
benefits first) the expansion in coverage of the poor should be higher than the
expansion in average coverage (and vice versa for “late” capture). These two
programs have different patterns. The OPK program appears to have expanded in
these 10 districts roughly neutrally — over the 10 months average coverage increased
15.4 percent and quintile I coverage by 18.8 percent.
By contrast, the medical services/health card program shows an interesting dynamic
of early capture. This program was slow to gain momentum as a JPS program and
when the program was very small (only 3.8 percent) it had worse than uniform
targeting, with more going to the richer than poorer households.  As the program first
came to scale from December 1998 to May 1999 as a JPS program, it went
disproportionately to the poor households — coverage among the poor increased by
11.7 percentage points (from 3.8 to 15.5) while average coverage increased by only 6
percentage points.  The expansion from May to October appears to have been
roughly neutral — with quintile I coverage increasingly modestly less than average
coverage (2.7 versus 3.9 percentage points).  This suggests that, as the program of
health cards and subsidized medical services went from being a “regular” program to a
crisis JPS program, it moved from the typical pattern of middle class capture to
decidedly pro-poor in the early phases of expansion.  However, as the program
matured it became less targeted.
Table 9.  Changes in targeting during program expansion
Ratio of coverage ratiosQuintile I
coverage QIII/QI QV/QI
Targeting
Ratio
Average
coverage
Subsidized Rice
Dec-98 47.93 0.90 0.62 0.96 40.73
May-99 66.29 0.87 0.68 0.96 56.45
Oct-99 66.74 0.86 0.65 0.95 56.11
Change Dec 98
to Oct 99 18.81 -0.04 0.03 0.00 15.38
Medical Services
Dec-98 3.80 1.44 1.52 1.07 5.22
May-99 15.49 0.65 0.49 0.91 11.23
Oct-99 18.20 0.84 0.72 0.95 15.13
Change Dec 98
to Oct 99 14.40 -0.60 -0.80 -0.12 9.91
Source:  Suryahadi et al., 2001 (adapted from table 2).
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B.  Interpretations
It is understandable that many government programs are “early capture” as richer and
more informed and powerful households would be the first to gain benefits but that
expansion would lead to better incidence.40 But the Indonesian experience with the
JPS program gives some (weak) indications that “safety net” programs were likely to
be “late capture” programs — that is, it would be easier to create strong targeting of
benefits in smallish programs, designed and designated for “the poor”.
                                                
40 Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) show that even the anti-poverty programs tend to be “early capture”
with higher marginal than average odds of participation (e.g. the Integrated Rural Development
Program and the Public Distribution System), although the public works program is better targeted
than either and marginal and average odds of participation are more similar than for the other two
programs.
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VI. DE JURE VERSUS DE FACTO TARGETING:
COMMUNITY INFLUENCE ON TARGETING
A recent strand of the literature on targeting has examined the possibilities of using
“communities” to target benefits to households.  The idea is that local communities
have quite good information on both the level and shocks to households welfare, and
hence if  local decision making structures could be employed to use that local
knowledge, then targeting could be improved without the high cost of improving
administrative targeting or self-selection targeting.  However, note the “if” in the
previous sentence is a very big if.
To use the superior local knowledge about conditions, “communities” must be given
discretionary power to allocate benefits. But this discretion could either lead to
superior targeting or to elite capture (Platteau 2000, Bardhan and Mookerjee 2000)
or to community pressures for more “spreading” of the benefits. Galasso and
Ravallion (2002) use data from Bangladesh’s Food-for-Education Program to show
that power in community decision making clearly affected outcomes (and that
centralized allocations to villages were not particularly pro-poor).  We examine this
issue with the Indonesian JPS with in three bits of evidence:  discussion of the OPK,
examining the non-income determinants of program receipt, and evidence from the
Local Level Institutions study linking individual and community social characteristics
and program distribution.
A.  Empirical Findings
OPK distribution at the village.  The SUSENAS and 100 Villages Survey data indicate
unambiguously that the de jure program distribution was not followed.  While the rice
allocated to a village area was (nearly always) based on the number of eligible
households, the rice was allocated to more than the eligible households.  Tables 1
and 2 show that almost twice as many households received the rice than if the
program guidelines have been followed and almost a quarter of households in the
richest group still receive the program benefits.
These quantitative findings accord well with anecdotal reports, as from the beginning
of the program observers noticed that the local leaders responsible for
implementation were not adhering to the list of eligible households, but rather were
distributing the rice amongst a much larger group.  As a result, while each eligible
household in many cases received lesser amount of rice than stipulated in the
program, other households, which were not officially eligible, also received an
allocation (Tim Dampak Krisis SMERU, 2000). The centrally planned
administrative guidelines apparently often proved socially unacceptable at the
community level (Sumarto and Suryahadi, 2002).
It is not at all clear whether the deviations at the local level were a “good” or “bad”
thing.  There are three main arguments made by village heads (kepala desa) to justify
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this practice.41  First, the official list is not an accurate list of those who are in need, as
due to the crisis, many households which formerly were not poor are also now in need
of assistance.  Second, even if the list is accurate, the distinctions drawn are too fine:
the differences between those households who are entitled and those who are not
does not justify one group receiving 10-20 kg of rice while the remainder receive
nothing. Third, village heads and community leaders argue that the targeted
distribution of this central government benefit is inconsistent with the spirit of
community solidarity and self-help (gotong royong).  The village heads point out that,
if everyone is expected to contribute their labor to community projects, then
everyone should also benefit from the unexpected windfall of assistance from the
central government.
These arguments raise important questions about the structure of the “optimal
feasible” targeting as communities may know better than the central government and
the BKKBN classification about the best distribution of rice within any given
community. Furthermore, local leaders may know better what is socially and
politically feasible.  Rice that went to “non-eligible” households, while inconsistent
with the program guidelines was not necessarily mis-targeting.  Moreover, local social
pressures around “fairness” clearly led to more uniform distribution, but which
implied lesser benefit for the poor.
On the other hand, providing too much discretion, and particularly discretion
without conditions for adequate local oversight can lead to abuses.  Olken et al.
(2001) show that local politics appeared to play some role in the way village heads
distribute OPK rice.  Anecdotal reports exist of local leaders abusing discretion in the
OPK and in other social programs.
Household demographic and social characteristics and JPS program allocation.  The 100
Villages Survey, in addition to having multiple rounds, also has information on
household’s participation in a variety of social organizations. We can examine
empirically whether these social characteristics played a role in program allocations,
over and above the household’s wealth (as proxied by assets), education, and
consumption expenditures as well as other characteristics. Table 10 reports the
percentage change in the likelihood of program participation for the various programs
for households of differing demographic composition and social behaviors.
                                                
41 This draws on reports of visits as well as the authors’ own experiences.
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Table 10.  Influence of household demographic and social characteristics on
participation in JPS programs, from three rounds of the 100 Villages Survey
OPK Scholarship Health PK
Mean of
variable
Percentage
change in
likelihood of
program
receipt Sig
Percentage
change in
likelihood of
program
receipt Sig.
Percentage
change in
likelihood of
program
receipt Sig.
Percentage
change in
likelihood of
program
receipt Sig.
Individual Membership in government/social organizations (from previous 100 Villages Round)
Women’s organization (PKK) 0.276 -2.38%* 24.10%** 16.75%** -29.12%**
Neighborhood organization 0.223 3.44%** -13.50%** -12.34%** -24.14%**
Youth Organization 0.132 3.65%** 3.79% -8.70%** -10.16%**
Burial society 0.518 4.06%** -2.12% -3.49% 60.41%**
Sport Organization 0.195 5.07%** 20.46%** -6.45%** -18.42%**
Religious 0.660 -9.74%** -10.49%** -0.02% -24.68%**
Rotating help/credit (arisan) 0.331 -2.38%* 24.10%** 16.75%** -29.12%**
Household characteristics
Age of the HH head 43.868 -0.34%** 0.65%** -0.44%** -0.44%**
Number of HH members 5.503 -0.31% 11.39%** -0.57% -1.15%
Female headed household 0.047 0.62% 43.65%** 1.10% -42.43%**
Married head of household 0.939 2.65% -23.48%** -6.91% -14.24%*
pred p 0.514 0.0658 0.069 0.0486
Psuedor2 0.242 0.112 0.103 0.217
N 133637 88853 133637 133637
Note:  The “percentage change” in the likelihood of program receipt is the marginal effect from the probit estimates
divided by the underlying predicted probability for each program.
Also included in all regressions:  consumption expenditures, change in consumption expenditures (since last round),
binary variables for nine asset ownership (e.g. radio, TV, bicycle), education of household head, sector of
employment, employment status (see Appendix table A.1).
The demographic characteristics of households do not appear to play a large role,
with two prominent exceptions.  First, children in female-headed households were
much more likely to receive scholarships, which is reassuring as this was part of
program design.  Second, people in female headed households were much less likely
to participate in labor creating programs, again not surprisingly as the “first round”
programs did little to encourage female participation.
The social characteristics present a different pattern. There is no question that,
statistically speaking, household membership in various social organizations played a
role in the receipt (or not) of the JPS programs.  Nearly all of the coefficients are
statistically significant, and, for various variables, quantitatively significant as well
(10 percent or more change in the probability of program participation). But the
pattern of signs is difficult to interpret. For instance, members of religious
organizations were consistently less likely to have received program benefits — but
was this because decision making procedures were biased against them somehow, or
because they were less likely to attempt to access the programs.  Having a member of
the household in the government organized women’s association (PKK) makes
individuals more likely to receive scholarships or use the health card, but much less
likely to participate in a labor creating program.
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Village characteristics and JPS program allocations.  The Local Level Institutions study
collected detailed information about social activities from individuals in 48 villages
in rural Indonesia.  From these detailed data four measures of “social” activity can be
derived (Alatas, Pritchett, and Wetterberg, 2002): participation in “social
organizations” (social activities in groups with fixed membership, leadership), “social
network” (social activities in spontaneous groups), “sociability” (frequency of
household visits to friends and relatives), “participation in village governance
organizations” (membership in the groups that were created to administer the desa).
Alatas, Pritchett and Wetterberg (2002) show these distinctions have different
impacts on desa governance.  Using the distinction between a households own social
activities and the average frequency of the sampled households in the same village
(less the household) we can examine whether the households’ own social
connections affect distribution (private benefits) versus whether the density of social
activity in the village itself makes a difference (externality type effects).  Table 11
shows that the associations are weak and vary across types of activity.  Living in a
village where social network activity is high is associated with higher program
participation (for labor creation, health significantly so, less so for scholarships and
credit).  Similarly, living in a village with high level of social organizations raises the
likelihood of household participation (which, since the average village participation
is fixed likely reflects greater spreading of the benefits).
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Table 11:  Likelihood of program receipt and social characteristics of
individuals and villages
OPK
Labor
Creating Health Scholarships Credit
Average
engagement in social
activities
Percentage
change in
likelihood
of program
receipt Sig.
Percentage
change in
likelihood
of program
receipt Sig.
Percentage
change in
likelihood
of program
receipt Sig.
Percentage
change in
likelihood
of program
receipt Sig.
Percentage
change in
likelihood
of program
receipt Sig.
Household -0.61% -0.38% -3.40% -14.75% 7.60%
Social
Organizations
Village
(less
household) 20.75%*** -0.19% -11.54% 6.60% 13.36%
Household 0.65% -0.13% -1.73% 0.93% 0.72%
Social
Network
Village
(less
household) -3.79%* 4.75%*** 20.52%*** 6.71% 5.32%
Household 0.27% 2.01%*** 5.19% -9.55% 16.17%***
Village
Government
Village
(less
household) 2.98% -0.65% -6.12% 21.33% -16.43%
Sociability Visits to others 0.62% -0.38% 0.69% 5.70%** 0.37%
Note:  The “percentage change” in the likelihood of program receipt is the marginal effect from the probit
estimates divided by the underlying predicted probability for each program.
Also included in all regressions:  quintiles consumption expenditures, change in consumption expenditures
(since the previous round in 1996), a principal components index of assets, education of household head, age
of the head, and binary variables for female headship, agricultural worker, government worker, employment
status (of head and spouse) and district.
Perhaps the most interesting result is the contrast between the JPS programs and the
“credit” programs run by the government that channeled resources to specific
activities.  A person who belonged to the government administrative apparatus was
much more likely to have gotten credit than a household who was not.  At the same
time, living in a village in which other people participate in the village governance
organizations reduces the likelihood of receiving credit.  JPS programs do not appear
to have been “captured” by local governments or their agents.
We try by examining the quality of village targeting and its relation to social
characteristics in a two-step procedure.  First, we regress program participation only
on economic criteria (e.g. linear to quartic terms in (natural log) consumption
expenditures, change in expenditures, wealth, whether the HH head or spouse is
unemployed, education, and HH size) and rank households by the predicted values of
this equation. Our measure of targeting performance is the fraction of the Nv
households in each village who did receive the jth JPS program who were among the
The SMERU Research Institute, October 200236
N highest (most likely) ranked recipients.  We find almost no association between
targeting performance (as we measure it) and social characteristics of the villages.42
Table 12: Quality of village targeting (fraction of the program participants that
were among those in the village that would be chosen on economic criteria alone,
0 is worst, 1 is best) and village social activity
OPK Labor Creating Health Scholarships CreditAverage
engagement in social
activities Coeff.
P
level Coeff.
P
level Coeff.
P
level Coeff.
P
level. Coeff.
P
level
Social Organizations 0.068 0.35 -0.182 0.09 -0.11 0.081 -0.095 0.35 -0.069 0.473
Social Networks -0.008 0.83 -0.003 0.96 0.066 0.046 0.049 0.49 0.006 0.910
Village Government 0.0039 0.95 0.202 0.04 -0.004 0.926 -0.035 0.73 0.136 0.101
Sociability -0.002 0.91 -0.016 0.63 -0.001 0.959 0.016 0.64 0.011 0.729
N 42 26 41 32 37
R2 0.511 0.416 0.679 0.17 0.277
Note:  Also included are binary variables for the district.
B.  Interpretations
The implementation of targeting will be influenced by household and community
characteristics and that influence does not necessarily lead to more “pro-poor”
targeting. The de jure design can work either to limit these influences or to
accommodate them by providing explicit local discretion, along with checks on that
discretion.
                                                
42 Galasso and Ravallion (2002) find no association of the intra-community targeting performance of
FFE (Food for Education) funds and village social characteristics (a cooperative society in the village,
club/recreation in the village) but do find that land inequality, shocks, isolation (no telephone in the
village) and higher private transfers lead to worse targeting of that public program.
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VII.  CONCLUSION
We will not recapitulate the empirical findings, nor lessons about crisis programs
more broadly, as there are many aspects of program design (e.g. institutional and
organizational capacity) and program impact on beneficiaries that we have not
addressed, and there were even aspects of targeting we have not addressed (e.g.
the cost of the various targeting mechanisms). Let us attempt four summary
statements.
First, “static participation incidence” (the relationship between program
participation and household consumption expenditures) was substantially better
than a uniform transfer, but substantially worse than perfect targeting, and
remarkably similar for all of the JPS programs. This implies that some designed
targeting produces much better targeting incidence than no targeting, but the de
jure design is not as critical.
Second, unlike standard static incidence measures, what we define as dynamic
participation incidence — the relationship between changes in consumption
expenditures and program participation — was very different among the JPS
programs.  The employment creation programs, which relied on self-selection
targeting, were much more likely to reach those households with large shocks to their
expenditures than programs based on administrative targeting such as subsidized rice
sales, scholarships, and health subsidies. This implies that, especially in a crisis, the
dynamics of household welfare is important and this requires dynamics in targeting,
either through self-selection (which is very expensive in benefits delivered per
program expenditure) or through administrative flexibility.
Third, larger coverage does not lead to either better or worse targeting:  there is no
general tendency across the programs for marginal incidence to be above, or below,
average incidence. This implies that neither small nor large is necessarily beautiful.
Fourth, the targeting design of many of the programs was not followed strictly in the
implementation of all of the programs. Community and individual characteristics
that were de jure irrelevant played a role in targeting in practice. In the cheap rice
program, community influence led to the program going to many more than the
eligible individuals.  In other programs, individual characteristics appear to have
influenced targeting. This implies that local conditions will influence
implementation, but “communities” may well demand less sharp targeting than
centralized administrative criteria.
The SMERU Research Institute, October 200238
REFERENCES
Alatas, Vivi, Lant Pritchett, and Anna Wetterberg (2002), ‘Voice Lessons:
Endogenous Organizations, Government Organizations and the Quality of
Local Governance’,  mimeo, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University.
Bardhan, Pranab and Dilip Mookerjee (2000), ‘Decentralizing Anti-Poverty
Programs in Developing Countries’, mimeo, University of California,
Berkeley.
Baulch, Bob and John Hoddinott (2000), ‘Economic Mobility and Poverty Dynamics
in Developing Countries,’ Journal of Development Studies, 36(6), pp. 1-24.
Besley, Timothy and Stepehn Coate (1992), ‘Workfare versus Welfare:  Incentive
Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty-Alleviation Programs’,
American Economic Review, 82(1), pp. 249-261.
BKKBN (1994), Pembangunan Keluarga Sejahtera di Indonesia Berdasarkan UU No. 10
Tahun 1992 dan GBHN 1993 [Developing Prosperous Families in Indonesia
Based on Law No. 10/1992 and State Guidelines 1999], Kantor Menteri
Negara Kependudukan/Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional,
Jakarta.
Blustein, (2001), The Chastening, Public Affairs, New York.
Cameron, Lisa A. (2002), ‘Did Social Safety Net Scholarships Reduce Drop-Out
Rates during the Indonesian Economic Crisis?’, Policy Research Working
Paper No. 2800, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Coady, David, Margaret Grosh, and John Hoddinott (2002), ‘The Targeting of
Transfers in Developing Countries: Review of Experience and Lessons’,
mimeo, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Dercon, Stefan and Pramila Krishnan (2000), ‘Vulnerability, Seasonality and Poverty
in Ethiopia’, Journal of Development Studies, 36(6), pp. 25-53.
Deuster, Paul R. (2002), ‘Survey of Recent Developments’, Bulletin of Indonesian
Economic Studies, 38(1), pp. 5-37.
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1990), The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Polity,
Oxford.
Feridhanusetyawan, Tubagus (1999), ‘The Impact of the Crisis on the Labor Market
in Indonesia’, Report prepared for the Asian Development Bank, Centre for
Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.
Ferreira, Francisco, Giovanna Prennushi, and Martin Ravallion (1999), ‘Protecting
the Poor from Macroeconomic Shocks: An Agenda for Action in a Crisis and
Beyond’, mimeo, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Filmer, Deon and Lant Pritchett (2001), ‘Estimating Wealth Effects without
Expenditure Data — Or Tears: An Application to Educational Enrollments in
States of India’, Demography, 38(1), pp 115-132.
The SMERU Research Institute, October 200239
Foster, James, J. Greer, and Erik Thorbecke (1984), ‘A Class of Decomposable
Poverty Measures,’ Econometrica, 52, pp. 761-766.
Frankenberg, Elizabeth, Duncan Thomas, and Kathleen Beegle (1999), ‘The Real
Costs of Indonesia’s Economic Crisis: Preliminary Findings from the
Indonesia Family Life Survey’, mimeo, RAND, Santa Monica, CA.
Galasso, Emanuela and Martin Ravallion (2002), ‘Distributional Outcomes of a
Decentralized Targeting Welfare Program’, Policy Research Working Paper
No. 2316, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Gelbach, Jonah and Lant Pritchett (2002), ‘Is More for the Poor is Less for the
Poor?’,  BEP Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy,  2(1).
Goodin, Robert E., Bruce Headey, Ruud Muffels, and Henk-Jan Dirven (1999), The
Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Grosh, Margaret E. (1994), Administering Targeted Social Programs in Latin America:
From Platitudes to Practice, World Bank Regional and Sectoral Studies, The
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Jalan, Jyotsna and Martin Ravallion (2000), ‘Is Transient Poverty Different?
Evidence Rural China’, Journal of Development Studies, 36(6), pp. 82-99.
Jalan, Jyotsna and Martin Ravallion (2002), ‘Estimating the Benefit Incidence of an
Anti-Poverty Porgram by Propensity Score Matching’, Journal of Business and
Economic Statistics, forthcoming.
Lanjouw, Peter and Martin Ravallion (1999), ‘Benefit Incidence, Public Spending
Reforms, and the Timing of Program Capture’, The World Bank Economic
Review, 13(2), pp. 257-273.
Manning, Chris (2000), ‘Labour Market Adjustment to Indonesia’s Economic Crisis:
Context, Trends and Implications’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies,
36(1), pp. 105-136.
McLeod, Ross H. (1998), ‘Indonesia’, in Ross H. McLeod and Ross Garnaut (eds.),
East Asia in Crisis: From being a Miracle to Needing One?, Routledge, London.
Olken, Benjamin A., Musriyadi Nabiu, Nina Toyamah, and Daniel Perwira (2001),
‘Sharing the Wealth: How Villages Decide to Distribute OPK Rice’, SMERU
Working Paper, October, The SMERU Research Institute, Jakarta.
Papanek, Gustav F. and Budiono Sri Handoko (1999), ‘The Impact on the Poor of
Growth and Crisis: Evidence from Real Wage Data’, Paper presented at
Conference on the Economic Issues Facing the New Government, LPEM-
FEUI, August 18-19, Jakarta.
Platteau, Jean-Philippe (2000), ‘Community Imperfections’, Paper prepared for
World Bank conference.
Poppele, Jessica, Sudarno Sumarto, and Lant Pritchett (1999), ‘Social Impacts of the
Indonesian Crisis: New Data and Policy Implications’, A SMERU Report,
February, Social Monitoring & Early Response Unit, Jakarta.
The SMERU Research Institute, October 200240
Rahayu, Sri Kusumastuti, Akhmadi, Hastuti, Pamadi Wibowo, Sri Budiati, Musriyadi
Nabiu, Sulton Mawardi, Syaikhu Usman, Laura E. Bailey, and John Maxwell
(1998), ‘Results of a SMERU Rapid Field Appraisal Mission: Implementation
of Special Market Operation (OPK) Program in Five Provinces’, SMERU
Special Report, December, Social Monitoring & Early Response Unit,
Jakarta.
Ravallion, Martin (2002a), ‘Who is Protected?’, mimeo, The World Bank,
Washington, D.C.
Ravallion, Martin (2002b), ‘Are the Poor Protected from Budget Cuts?  Evidence
from Argentina’, Journal of Applied Economics, forthcoming.
Saadah, Fadia, Menno Pradhan, and Robert Sparrow (2000), ‘The Effectiveness of
the Healthcard as an Instrument to Ensure Access to Medical Care for the
Poor During the Crisis’, mimeo, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Sumarto, Sudarno, Anna Wetterberg, and Lant Pritchett (1998), ‘The Social Impact
of the Crisis in Indonesia: Results from a Nationwide Kecamatan Survey’,
SMERU Report, December, Social Monitoring & Early Response Unit,
Jakarta.
Sumarto, Sudarno, Asep Suryahadi (2002), ‘Indonesia’s Experience with Social
Safety Nets: Lessons Learned and Future Prospect’, in OECD (ed.), Towards
Asia’s Sustainable Development: The Role of Social Protection, Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development, Paris.
Sumarto, Sudarno, Asep Suryahadi, and Lant Pritchett (2000), ‘Safety Nets and
Safety Ropes: Who Benefited from Two Indonesian Crisis Programs  the
“Poor” or the “Shocked?”’, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2436,
September, The World Bank, Washington, DC.
Sumarto, Sudarno, Asep Suryahadi, and Wenefrida Widyanti (2001), ‘Designs and
Implementation of the Indonesian Social Safety Net Programs: Evidence from
the JPS Module in the 1999 SUSENAS’, SMERU Working Paper, March,
The SMERU Research Institute, Jakarta.
Suryahadi, Asep, Sudarno Sumarto, Yusuf Suharso, and Lant Pritchett (2000), ‘The
Evolution of Poverty during the Crisis in Indonesia, 1996-99’, Policy Research
Working Paper No. 2435, September, The World Bank, Washington, DC.
Suryahadi, Asep, Wenefrida Widyanti, Sudarno Sumarto, and Lant Pritchett (2002),
‘The Impact of Indonesian Social Safety Net Programs on Household
Welfare’, SMERU Working Paper, The SMERU Research Institute, Jakarta,
forthcoming.
Suryahadi, Asep, Yusuf Suharso, and Sudarno Sumarto (1999), ‘Coverage and
Targeting in the Indonesian Social Safety Net Programs: Evidence from 100
Village Survey’, SMERU Working Paper, August, Social Monitoring & Early
Response Unit, Jakarta.
The SMERU Research Institute, October 200241
Tim Dampak Krisis SMERU (2000), ‘Laporan Perkembangan Pelaksanaan Program
Operasi Pasar Khusus (OPK): Januari 1999 – Maret 2000’ [Report on the
Development of the Implementation of the Special Market Operation (OPK)
Program: January 1999 – March 2000], Laporan Khusus SMERU, April,
Social Monitoring & Early Response Unit, Jakarta.
TKPPJPS (1999), Program Jaring Pengaman Sosial JPS [JPS the Social Safety Net
Program], Tim Koordinasi Pengelolaan Program Jaring Pengaman Sosial,
Jakarta.
van de Walle, Dominique and Kimberley Nead (1995), Public Spending and the Poor:
Theory and Evidence, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
Widyanti, Wenefrida, Sudarno Sumarto, and Asep Suryahadi (2001), ‘Short-term
Poverty Dynamics: Evidence from Rural Indonesia’, SMERU Working Paper,
September, The SMERU Research Institute, Jakarta.
World Bank (1999), Indonesia: From Crisis to Opportunity, The World Bank,
Washington, D.C.
World Bank (2001), Indonesia: Constructing a New Strategy for Poverty Reduction, The
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
The SMERU Research Institute, October 200242
Appendix Table A1: Influence of household characteristics on participation in
JPS programs, from three rounds of the 100 Villages Survey
OPK Scholarship Health PK
means Percent Sig Percent Sig. Percent Sig. Sig.
Ln(real per capita household
expenditures) 11.200 -0.271 ** -0.173 ** -0.437 ** -0.623 **
Change in real per capita
expenditures 0.028 -0.110 ** 0.175 ** -0.037 -0.194 **
Membership in government/social organizations (from previous round)
Women’s organization (PKK) 0.276 -0.029 ** -0.004 0.283 ** 0.083 *
Neighborhood organization
(Dasa Wisma) 0.223 -0.024 * 0.241 ** 0.168 ** -0.291 **
Youth Organization (Karang
Taruna) 0.132 0.034 ** -0.135 ** -0.123 ** -0.241 **
Burial society 0.518 0.037 ** 0.038 -0.087 ** -0.102 **
Sport Organization 0.195 0.041 ** -0.021 -0.035 0.604 **
Religious 0.660 0.051 ** 0.205 ** -0.065 ** -0.184 **
Rotating help/credit (arisan) 0.331 -0.097 ** -0.105 ** 0.000 -0.247 **
Household characteristics
Age of the HH head 43.868 -0.003 ** 0.006 ** -0.004 ** -0.004 **
Number of HH members 5.503 -0.003 0.114 ** -0.006 -0.011
Female headed household 0.047 0.006 0.437 ** 0.011 -0.424 **
Married head of household 0.939 0.027 -0.235 ** -0.069 -0.142 *
Highest level of Education of household head (none is default)
Primary 0.571 -0.079 ** 0.011 -0.039 0.139 **
Lower secondary 0.092 -0.232 ** -0.026 -0.108 ** 0.213 **
Higher secondary 0.098 -0.411 ** -0.220 ** -0.109 * -0.455 **
Tertiary 0.025 -0.709 ** -0.347 ** -0.487 ** -0.616 **
Sector of “main source of household income”
Industry 0.059 0.074 ** 0.184 ** -0.059 -0.278 **
Trade 0.112 0.017 -0.047 -0.213 ** -0.243 **
Service 0.217 0.003 -0.016 -0.114 ** -0.177 **
Other 0.012 -0.042 0.368 ** 0.042 -0.558 **
Employment status of the individual (unemployed is default)
Self employed/employer 0.691 0.010 0.260 ** -0.082 * 0.210 **
Employee 0.235 -0.041 ** 0.451 ** -0.158 ** 0.400 **
Family worker 0.010 -0.038 0.903 ** -0.081 0.460 **
Ownership of various assets
radio*| 0.651 -0.015 * -0.135 ** -0.209 ** 0.180 **
tv*| 0.406 -0.150 ** -0.002 -0.217 ** -0.206 **
refri*| 0.091 -0.295 ** -0.424 ** -0.469 ** -0.280 **
phone*| 0.511 -0.055 ** -0.002 -0.041 -0.136 **
Dishant*| 0.070 -0.270 ** -0.290 ** -0.382 ** 0.098
bike*| 0.381 -0.030 ** -0.040 0.359 ** 0.472 **
Mtrbike*| 0.168 -0.058 ** -0.292 ** -0.082 * -0.181 **
car*| 0.046 -0.050 ** -0.336 ** 0.050 -0.281 **
land*| 0.737 -0.032 ** -0.003 -0.492 ** 0.720 **
Predicted P 0.514 0.0658 0.069 0.0486
Pseudo R2 0.242 0.112 0.103 0.217
N 133,637 88,853 133,637 133,637
